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Abstract
The success of complex autonomous robotic systems depends on the quality and correctness of
their fault tolerant control systems. A goal-based approach to fault tolerant control, which is mod-
eled after a control architecture developed at the Jet Propulsion Laboratory, uses networks of goals
to control autonomous systems. The complex conditional branching of the control program makes
safety verification necessary. Three novel verification methods are presented. In the first, goal
networks are converted to linear hybrid automata via a bisimulation. The converted automata can
then be verified against an unsafe set of conditions using an existing symbolic model checker such
as PHAVer. Due to the complexity issues that result from this method, a design for verification
software tool, the SBT Checker, was developed to create goal networks that have state-based tran-
sitions. Goal networks that have state-based transitions can be converted to hybrid automata whose
locations’ invariants contain all information necessary to determine the transitions between the lo-
cations. An original verification software called InVeriant can then be used to find unsafe locations
of linear hybrid systems based on the locations’ invariants and rate conditions, which are compared
to the unsafe set of conditions. The reachability of the unsafe locations depends only on the reach-
ability of the states of the state variables constrained in the locations’ invariants from those state
variables’ initial conditions. In cases where this reachability condition is not trivially true, the soft-
ware efficiently searches for a path to the unsafe locations using properties of the system. The third
verification method is the calculation of the failure probability of the verified hybrid control system
due to state estimation uncertainty, which is extremely important in autonomous systems that rely
heavily on the state estimates made from sensor measurements. Finally, two significant example
goal network control programs, one for a complex rover and another for a proposed aerobot mission
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